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THE “PUBLIC ACCESS DOCTRINE”:
OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SUN,
SURF, AND SAND
Robert George*

I. INTRODUCTION
Before Brenden Leydon came along, the Town of Greenwich,
Connecticut had an ordinance that banned out-of-towners from its beach.1
Leydon, however, wanted to jog down the Greenwich Point Beach and,
believing he had a right to do so, filed a lawsuit against the Town.2 His
right to jog on the beach, he first argued, was rooted in the public trust
doctrine,3 an ancient law developed by a Roman Emperor4 who may have
believed, as Leydon did, that something special about the seashore made it
a place that everyone should be able to access. Leydon next argued, under
a more modern and familiar doctrine, that his right to free speech and
expression was violated when he was prevented from accessing the beach
and “exchanging ideas and information with other park users.”5 He lost.
The trial court noted that while the public trust doctrine is well known,

*. University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2006.
1. Leydon v. Town of Greenwich, 777 A.2d 552 (Conn. 2001) n.5 [hereinafter Leydon
II]; Greenwich, Conn. Special Acts of 1919, § 7-30 (providing in relevant part “[i]n
accordance with No. 124 of the Special Acts of 1919, as amended, and recognizing that
public parks . . . have been acquired . . . for the use of inhabitants of the Town . . . only
inhabitants of the Town may enter, remain upon or use [the town’s] parks . . . .”).
2. Leydon v. Town of Greenwich, 750 A.2d 1122, 1124 (Conn. 2000) [hereinafter
Leydon I].
3. Id.
4. COASTAL STATES ORGANIZATION, INC., PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO
WORK: THE APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE TO THE MANAGEMENT OF LANDS,
WATERS AND LIVING RESOURCES OF THE COASTAL STATES (David C. Slade et al. eds., 2d ed.
1997).
5. Leydon II, 777 A.2d at 560-61 n.10. The complaint alleged that the “‘plaintiff’s
attempt to enter upon the [p]ark was for purposes of expressing himself by exchanging ideas
and information with other park users on topics of social and political importance.’”
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there was no authority to apply it to this case.6 He appealed and won on the
grounds that the public trust doctrine did apply, and that the town ordinance
violated it.7 The appellate court noted that “[f]or almost two centuries, our
Supreme Court has discussed the concept that land held by a municipality
as a public park or public beach is held for the use of the general public and
not solely for use by the residents of the municipality.”8 The Town
appealed, and the Connecticut Supreme Court reached yet another outcome,
one that differed from both of the lower courts. It found that Leydon had
a right to the beach not on the basis of a doctrine handed down from the
Roman Empire, but as a right of expression.9
It is not surprising that faced with a question regarding who has rights
to access the beach, three different courts came to three different
conclusions. The nation’s beaches are more crowded than ever.10 Each
year, the nation’s beaches host approximately two billion visits, more than
twice the number of visits to the combined “properties of the National Park
Service (286 million) Bureau of Land Management (106 million) and all
state parks and recreation areas (767 million).”11 The handling of the
Leydon decision reflects three approaches for dealing with the tension
between the rights of beachfront property owners, whether private or
municipal, and the increasing public demand for the beach. This Comment
will examine the approach of two states still adhering to a narrow
interpretation of the ancient public trust doctrine that limits public access.
It will then explore the possibility of a new public access doctrine based on
authorities inherent in both the public trust doctrine and freedom of
expression.
The two doctrines are distinct and have developed from separate bodies
of law with different historical underpinnings. But both of them are based
on the notion of obligations incumbent upon the government by virtue of
its ownership or, in the case of the public trust doctrine, stewardship, of
certain types of property.
Part II of this Comment will examine the public trust doctrine, focusing
on its application in states that have interpreted it broadly. Part III will
examine the doctrine as it exists in Maine and Massachusetts, where courts

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Leydon I, 750 A.2d at 1125.
Id. at 1124.
Id. at 1126.
Leydon II, 777 A.2d at 555-56.
JAMES HOUSTON, U.S. ARMY ENGINEER RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CENTER, THE
E C O N O M I C V ALU E O F B E AC H E S – A 2 0 0 2 U P D A T E , a v a i l a b l e a t
http://www.netlobby.com/pdf/value_of_beaches2.pdf.
11. Id.
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have so far refused to use it as a tool for opening up the beaches for the
general public. Part IV will examine the public forum doctrine, the notion
that there are places such as “streets and parks” that, by their very nature
as public fora, must remain open to those who wish to exercise their
freedom of speech and expression.12 Part V will further compare the
fundamental values underlying both doctrines. Part VI will examine the
Leydon decision in detail, focusing on the use of the public forum doctrine
as a means of gaining access to the beach. Finally, Part VII will propose
a new “public access doctrine,” a concept that merges the state ownership
interests granted through public trust with the constitutional protection
afforded public fora, to achieve a potent new argument in favor of opening
up the nation’s beaches.
It is important to acknowledge the difficulties of achieving a pure
synthesis of the two doctrines. Most significantly, the public forum
doctrine typically deals with property owned by the government;13 the
public trust doctrine deals with property that the government holds in trust
for the public welfare, even though actual title to the land may lie in private
hands.14 Also, the public forum doctrine deals with free speech and
expression. The public trust doctrine, on the other hand, grants access for
the purposes of fishing, navigation, and, in most states, recreation. Finally,
the public trust doctrine is derived from state common law,15 while the
public forum doctrine is rooted in constitutional precedent dealing with
limits the government can impose on free speech.16
Despite these differences, the Connecticut decision highlighted the
fundamental interests that are inherent in both doctrines, and that are at
stake any time a fence is erected between the beach and people who want
to use it.
II. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
But look! here come more crowds, pacing straight for the water,
and seemingly bound for a dive. Strange! Nothing will content

12. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
13. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1188 (Robert
C. Clark et al. eds., Foundation Press, 14th ed. 2001).
14. COASTAL STATES ORGANIZATION, INC., supra note 4, at 1.
15. Id.
16. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 13, at 1188.
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them but the extremest limit of the land. . . . No. They must get just
as nigh the water as they possibly can without falling in.
—Herman Melville, Moby Dick17

The public trust doctrine, a common law doctrine, grants each state a
legal interest in its shorelines to hold in trust for the general public.18 The
doctrine’s ancient roots began around 530 A.D. when codified by Roman
Emperor Justinian.19 Specifically, the body of Roman civil law codified by
the emperor in the “Institutes of Justinian,” dictates that:
By the law of nature these things are common to all mankind—the
air, running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea.
No one, therefore, is forbidden to approach the seashore, provided
that he respects habitations, monuments, and buildings, which are
not, like the sea, subject only to the law of nations.20
The original code acknowledged that the seashore was “subject to the same
law as the sea itself, and the ground or sand beneath it,” and could not be
considered private property.21
The doctrine was subsequently adopted and strengthened by English
common law, which imposed on the government “an affirmative duty to
administer, protect, manage and conserve fish and wildlife.”22
The doctrine was imported into the Americas, where it has been
interpreted as splitting the title of property along the seashore.23
Because of their special and public nature, the title to public trust
lands is not a singular title in the manner of most other real estate
titles. Rather, public trust land is vested with two titles, one
dominant and the other subservient. . . . The dominant title is the
jus publicum, simply described as the bundle of trust rights of the
public to fully use and enjoy trust lands and waters for commerce,
navigation, fishing, bathing and other related public purposes. The

17. HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK 17 (The Franklin Library 1979) (1851), quoted in
COASTAL STATES ORGANIZATION, INC., supra note 4, at xii.
18. Id. at 1.
19. Id.
20. JUSTINIAN INST. 2.1.1 (Thomas Collett Sandars trans., 7th Am. ed. 1876).
21. Id. at 2.1.5.
22. David C. Slade, The Public Trust Doctrine: A Gift from a Roman Emperor,
COASTLINES,Fall 1997, at 21-22 (Vol. 7, No. 4), available at www.epa.gov/owow/estuaries/
coastlines/97fall.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2006).
23. COASTAL STATES ORGANIZATION, INC., supra note 4, at 6.

2005-2006]

The “Public Access Doctrine”

77

subservient title is the jus privatum or the private proprietary rights
in the use and possession of trust lands.24
The modern doctrine in the United States goes beyond the mere grant
of a trust to the various states; it imbues them with an obligation. For
example, in voiding a deal in which the Illinois legislature deeded to the
Illinois Central Railroad the entire waterfront area of Chicago, the Court
found that the State was banned from conveying public trust land in a way
that would effectively destroy the public’s right to it.25 Moreover, in a
more modern case, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, the Court defined
the land covered under the public trust as any waterway influenced by the
ocean’s tides, regardless of whether it is navigable.26 In Phillips Petroleum,
an oil company was barred from staking claim to the land beneath eleven
streams that flowed into the Gulf of Mexico because the State, “upon
entering the Union, [was] given ownership over all lands beneath waters
subject to the tide’s influence.”27
As such, the doctrine has a wide geographic reach. It includes
“navigable” waters and the lands beneath them, encompassing 191,000
square miles of navigable water within states’ boundaries, or approximately
the combined size of Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
and Georgia.28
It is left to the individual states to lay out the limits of the access rights
granted under the doctrine. In New Jersey, for instance, the courts have
defined the right to access broadly, granting to the public the right to access
the beach for the purposes of sunbathing and swimming.29 This right of
access extends not only to the intertidal zone, but also to the sandy beach
above it.30 Furthermore, the right of access may include public streets and
upland sand areas as a means of entry to the beach.31 The New Jersey
Supreme Court found that it does not matter whether the public trust

24. Id.
25. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 460 (1892). The Court held that “[t]here can
be no irrepealable contract in a conveyance of property by a grantor in disregard of a public
trust, under which he was bound to hold and manage it.”
26. 484 U.S. 469, 476 (1988).
27. Id. at 484.
28. COASTAL STATES ORGANIZATION, INC., supra note 4, at 2. Although the public trust
doctrine reaches some waters that are not in fact navigable, the phrase “navigable waters”
has been retained in the law to denote all waters covered under the doctrine. See Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. at 480-81.
29. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass’n, 471 A.2d 355, 358 (N.J. 1984) (citing
Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 294 A.2d 47 (N.J. 1972)).
30. Id. at 363.
31. Id. at 365.
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doctrine is being used to provide access to a private or a municipal beach,
noting that due to “the increasing demand for our State’s beaches and the
dynamic nature of the public trust doctrine, we find that the public must be
given both access to and use of privately-owned dry sand areas as
reasonably necessary.”32 In doing so, New Jersey recognizes that the public
trust doctrine, while historically a device to allow access in order to protect
commerce and navigation, has always hinged on something more: “a deeply
inherent right of the citizenry.”33 The New Jersey Supreme Court also
recognizes that the doctrine needs to change with the times, stating:
We have no difficulty in finding that, in this latter half of the
twentieth century, the public rights in tidal lands are not limited to
the ancient prerogatives of navigation and fishing, but extend as
well to recreational uses, including bathing, swimming and other
shore activities. The public trust doctrine . . . should not be considered fixed or static, but should be molded and extended to meet
changing conditions and needs of the public it was created to
benefit.34
California, like New Jersey, has defined the doctrine broadly. In
California, the doctrine:
provid[es] the public the right to use California’s water resources
for: navigation, fisheries, commerce, environmental preservation
and recreation; as ecological units for scientific study; as open
space; as environments which provide food and habitats for birds
and marine life; and as environments which favorably affect the
scenery and climate of the area.35
It is generally recognized, as in New Jersey and California, that the
doctrine can be modified over time to meet the evolving public need and
usage of the public trust lands.36 The Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia noted that:
More recently, courts and commentators have found in the doctrine
a dynamic common-law principle flexible enough to meet diverse
modern needs. The doctrine has been expanded to protect additional water-related uses such as swimming and similar recreation,
Id.
Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-By-The-Sea, 294 A.2d at 53.
Id. at 309.
CALIFORNIA STATE LANDS COMMISSION, CALIFORNIA’S RIVERS, A PUBLIC TRUST
REPORT – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY vi (1993).
36. COASTAL STATES ORGANIZATION, INC., supra note 4, at 172 n.32.
32.
33.
34.
35.
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aesthetic enjoyment of rivers and lakes, and preservation of the
flora and fauna indigenous to public trust lands. It has evolved
from a primarily negative restraint on states’ ability to alienate
trust lands into a source of positive state duties.37
III. MAINE AND MASSACHUSETTS: A NARROW VIEW OF THE
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
Not only does the public trust doctrine differ from state to state, it has
varied in its influence throughout history. After a period of relative
dormancy, the doctrine was revived in 1988 by Phillips Petroleum.38 After
that ruling, twenty-nine coastal states formed the Coastal States
Organization to research the doctrine’s historical roots and modern
application.39
The trend towards interpreting the doctrine broadly has reached most
states, with two major exceptions—Maine and Massachusetts.40 These two
holdouts adhere to a much narrower interpretation of the doctrine that
excludes the right to use beaches for recreational purposes, such as
sunbathing and walking.41 Both Massachusetts and Maine, which was part
of Massachusetts when the courts formulated what is now a shared
interpretation of the public trust doctrine, trace this interpretation of the
doctrine to the Massachusetts Colonial Ordinance of 1641-1647.42
Massachusetts codified the doctrine in 1648 in The Book of General Lawes
and Libertyes Concerning the Inhabitants of Massachusetts.43 The doctrine
was heavily influenced by the geography of the shoreline of Massachusetts,
which then included the Province of Maine. This coastline includes long,
slowly sloping beaches that defy easy access by ships.44 To encourage
private development of piers long enough to reach out into deep water, the
courts adopted a version of the doctrine more favorable to private property

37. District of Columbia v. Air Florida Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
38. COASTAL STATES ORGANIZATION, INC., supra note 4, at xiii.
39. Id.
40. See Slade, supra note 22.
41. Id.
42. Bell v. Town of Wells, 510 A.2d 509, 512-13 (Me. 1986) [hereinafter Bell I]; see
also Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 175 (Me. 1989) [hereinafter Bell III] (noting that
“[t]he Maine common law rules defining property interests in intertidal land come from the
same Colonial Ordinance source as the Massachusetts common law rules on that subject, and
the Maine case development on the subject has in no significant respect departed from that
in Massachusetts.”).
43. Bell I, 510 A.2d at 512.
44. Slade, supra note 22.
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rights, granting only a public easement to the intertidal zone45 and limiting
the access to the purposes of “fishing, fowling, and navigation.”46
Maine and Massachusetts also have interpreted the doctrine as giving
the state something less than jus publicum, the “bundle of trust rights of the
public to fully use and enjoy trust lands,” normally taken under the public
trust doctrine.47 Accordingly, it leaves for the private property owners
something more than the traditional jus privatum title to “private
proprietary rights in the use and possession of trust lands.”48 The private
right is dominant, while the public right to access is a mere easement for
the limited purposes of navigation, fishing, and fowling.49
Despite the economic nature of access granted, the Colonial Ordinance
recognized the fundamental nature of the right it was dealing with,
designating this right as one of only three Liberty Common rights.50 The
other two rights were the right to leave the colony and, more significantly,
the right to free speech.51
Thus under the Colonial Ordinance the public right to use the
intertidal zone was seen in terms of an individual freedom. As
Chief Justice Shaw wrote, the “great purpose” of the enactment
was “to declare a great principle of public right, to abolish the
forest laws, the same laws and the laws designed to secure several
and exclusive fisheries and to make them all free.” The Colonial
Ordinance did not designate who “owned” or “held” the right to
use the intertidal zone, just as we would not attempt to designate
who “owns” freedom of speech.52
Nonetheless, when the issue was recently revisited in Maine, the Supreme
Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, found that the public trust doctrine,
as defined by the Colonial Ordinance, did not include a right to access for
the purposes of recreation.53 Beachfront owners brought the case after the
legislature sought to broaden the scope of the doctrine by passing the
Public Trust in Intertidal Land Act of 1986 (“the Act”).54 The legislature
“declared that ‘the intertidal lands of the State are impressed with a public

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Bell I, 510 A.2d at 515 n.13.
Slade, supra note 22.
COASTAL STATES ORGANIZATION, INC., supra note 4, at 6.
Id.
Bell III, 557 A.2d at 173.
Bell I, 510 A.2d at 516.
Id.
Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 68 (1851)).
Bell III, 557 A.2d at 173.
12 M.R.S.A. §§ 571–573 (2005).
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trust,’ . . . and that those rights of the public include a ‘right to use intertidal
land for recreation.’”55 The Act stated that “[t]hese recreational uses are
among the most important to the Maine people today who use intertidal
land for relaxation from the pressures of modern society and for the
enjoyment of nature’s beauty.”56 In Bell, landowners on Moody Beach in
the Town of Wells sued the town to enjoin it from extending the public
trust doctrine to include the right of walkers and sunbathers to use the
beach in front of their homes.57 The Law Court struck down the Act on the
ground that granting a right to recreation on privately owned beaches is
unconstitutional under the Takings Clause of the Maine Constitution.58 The
Law Court noted that “constitutional prohibitions on the taking of private
property without compensation must be considered.”59
The Massachusetts rule on general recreation is even narrower than the
Maine rule, which extends access at least to those who are engaging in
recreational fishing.60 Drawing on the English common law that excludes
bathing as a justification for beach access, Massachusetts courts have held
that the public trust doctrine does not extend to recreation of any sort.61
The Massachusetts Supreme Court confirmed this finding in an opinion
advising the Massachusetts House of Representatives that a proposed law
extending the scope of the public trust doctrine to include “public on-foot
free right-of-passage” would allow for unconstitutional takings of private
property.62
Because the Colonial Ordinance granted an easement for only three
specific purposes, any attempt by the respective legislatures in Maine and
Massachusetts to expand the doctrine to include recreation in order to keep
pace with modern demands has invoked the Takings Clause of their
respective constitutions.63 Both legislatures have tried to expand the
doctrine, but both have failed in the face of the Takings Clause, which “was
designed to operate and it does operate to prevent the acquisition of any
title to land or to an easement in it or to a permanent appropriation of it,
from an owner for public use, without the actual payment or tender of a just
compensation for it.”64

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Bell III, 557 A.2d at 176 (citations omitted).
12 M.R.S.A. §§ 571–573 (Supp. 1988).
Bell III, 557 A.2d at 168.
Id. See also 12 M.R.S.A. §§ 571–573 (Supp. 1988); Me Const. art. III.
Bell III, 557 A.2d at 169.
Butler v. Attorney General, 80 N.E. 688 (Mass. 1907).
See id. at 689.
Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E. 2d 561, 571 (Mass. 1974).
Bell III, 557 A.2d 168, 176 (Me. 1989).
Id. at 177 (citing Cushman v. Smith, 34 Me. 247, 265 (1852)).
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Courts in Massachusetts and Maine have also unwisely clung to a
public trust doctrine rooted in a defunct value system that provides no
adequate justification in modern times. As Maine courts have
acknowledged, “[t]he Puritans did not believe in exposing themselves to the
sun. Neither the Puritans nor anyone else in 17th Century Massachusetts,
Maine or England believed in regular bathing as we know it today.”65
Fundamental rights, however, are fundamental precisely because they are
not relative to the era in which they exist. The court’s reasoning implies
that had the Puritans been regular sunbathers with a penchant for
cleanliness, then the right to access the beaches might be interpreted
differently today.
Yet the courts are not unsympathetic to the need for providing access
to shorefront property for recreation. Some have suggested that the proper
solution “is for the State or municipalities to purchase the needed property
rights or obtain them by eminent domain through the payment of just
compensation, not to take them without compensation through legislative
or judicial decree redefining the scope of private property rights.”66 But
there has also been a call to overturn Bell III, which was decided by a
narrow 4-3 margin. In one recent case, Justice Saufley, noting that Maine’s
3,480 miles of coastline is the longest on the eastern seaboard, echoed the
Bell III dissent, which called for broadening the public trust doctrine.67 In
Bell III, Justice Wathen wrote in dissent that “[t]he rights of the public are,
at a minimum, broad enough to include such recreational activities as
bathing, sunbathing and walking.”68 Affirming that view, Justice Saufley
noted that the majority view in Bell III was an:
unduly narrow judicial construction of the time-honored public
trust doctrine [that] . . . restricted the public’s right to peaceful
enjoyment of one of this state’s major resources, the intertidal
zones. Pursuant to our holding in Bell [III], a citizen of the state
may walk along a beach carrying a fishing rod or a gun, but may
not walk along the same beach empty-handed or carrying a
surfboard. This interpretation is clearly flawed.69

65. Bell v. Town of Wells, YORSC-CV-84-125 (Me. Super. Ct., Yor. Cty., Sept. 14,
1987) (Brodrick, J.),1987 Me. Super. LEXIS 256, 10 (Me. Super. Ct. 1987) [hereinafter Bell
II].
66. Bell III, 557 A.2d at 180.
67. Eaton v. Town of Wells, 2000 ME 176, ¶ 51, 760 A.2d 232, 248-49 (Saufley, J.,
concurring) (citing Bell III, 557 A.2d at 187-89 (Wathen, J., dissenting)).
68. Bell III, 557 A.2d at 189.
69. Eaton v. Town of Wells, 2000 ME 176, ¶ 51, 760 A.2d at 248-49 (footnote omitted).
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Finally, it is worth noting that both states acknowledge that the public
trust doctrine can be expanded. The Maine Law Court has found this to be
the case where common law rights “ha[ve] been so largely accepted and
acted on by the community as law that it would be fraught with mischief to
set [them] aside.”70 The Superior Court of Maine also noted “the Colonial
Ordinance was not exclusive. It did not . . . preclude the development of
new common law property rights.”71 The precedent in Massachusetts for
changing the doctrine to meet modern needs goes back more than a century.
One court noted that the doctrine must change with time and that the
doctrine itself was broad enough to include all new uses as they arise.72 A
later court affirmed, noting the doctrine “includes all necessary and proper
uses, in the interest of the public.” 73
The decision in both states to deny access depends heavily on historical
precedent that is no longer relevant. It defies modern usage patterns of
sunbathing and other recreational uses that are “largely accepted and acted
on by the community.”74 As such, the doctrine in both states may be
vulnerable to a renewed attack, one reinforced with constitutional armor.
IV. THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court has noted that:
[t]he rights of free speech and assembly, while fundamental in our
democratic society, still do not mean that everyone with opinions
or beliefs to express may address a group at any public place and
at any time. The constitutional guarantee of liberty implies the
existence of an organized society maintaining public order, without
which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of anarchy.75
But the Court has imposed a stringent test on any governmental restriction
on expression in a public forum. Those restrictions must be time, place,
and manner restrictions that are narrowly tailored to meet a compelling
state interest.76 The Court has frowned upon restrictions that go beyond
70. Barrows v. McDermott, 73 Me. 441, 448-49 (1882); see also Bell II, YORSC-CV84-125 (Me. Super. Ct., Yor. Cty., Sept. 14, 1987) (Brodrick, J.), 1987 Me. Super. LEXIS
256 at 13.
71. Id. at 23.
72. See Inhabitants of West Roxbury v. Stoddard, 89 Mass. 158, 167 (1863).
73. Home for Aged Women v. Commonwealth, 89 N.E. 124, 129 (Mass. 1909).
74. Bell II, YORSC-CV-84-125 (Me. Super. Ct., Yor. Cty., Sep. 14, 1987) (Brodrick,
J.),1987 Me. Super. LEXIS 256 at 13 (citing Barrows v. McDermott, 73 Me. at 448-49).
75. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965).
76. See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
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this, consistently striking down restrictions that impose a total ban on a
particular medium of expression.77
The notion that there are certain places that by force of habit and
custom have become public fora where people have a constitutional right
to express themselves first appeared in the dictum of a pre-World War II
Supreme Court case.78 Justice Roberts said:
[w]herever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time
out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.
Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times,
been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights and liberties of
citizens. The privilege . . . to use the streets and parks for
communication of views on national questions may be regulated in
the interest of all; . . . but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be
abridged or denied.79
The doctrine developed and strengthened over the years until it became
so entrenched that Justice Kennedy noted in dicta that “[a]t the heart of our
jurisprudence lies the principle that in a free nation citizens must have the
right to gather and speak with other persons in public places.”80 The
doctrine, however, is flexible and has been applied differently by courts
over the years.81
Unlike the fixed boundaries that define the reach of the public trust
doctrine, the boundaries of the public forum doctrine defy geographical
demarcation. In general, the Court separates government owned property
into three categories for the purposes of determining how much the

77. See Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (striking down a ban on blow horns
because it left too much discretion in the hands of the police chief); Schneider v. State, 308
U.S. 147 (1939) (invalidating a ban on leaflets on the grounds that the state interest in
preventing littering was insubstantial compared to the right of expression in a public forum);
Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002)
(invalidating a total ban on the distribution of leaflets by ringing people’s doorbells).
78. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 514 (1939).
79. Id. at 515-16.
80. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 696 (1992).
81. David S. Day, The End of the Public Forum Doctrine, 78 IOWA L. REV. 143, 159
(1992) (arguing that after a period in which the Warren and Burger Courts used the doctrine
as a means of protecting free speech, the Rehnquist Court reversed course and now interprets
it in a way to restrict speech).
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government may restrict speech: 1) the traditional public forum, 2) the
designated public forum, and 3) the nonpublic forum.82
In a nonpublic forum, the government has wide ranging powers to
restrict speech.83 In Perry Education Association v. Perry Local
Educators’ Association, the seminal case for the application of the modern
public forum doctrine, the Court determined that a school mail system,
including teachers’ mailboxes, was a nonpublic forum, and as such, the
school could allow access to the teachers’ union while restricting access to
a competing union.84 The government, however, can transform a nonpublic forum, such as the teachers’ mailboxes, into a designated public
forum by opening it up “for use by the public as a place for expressive
activity.”85 A designated public forum enjoys the same free speech
protection as a traditional one. In both, only “reasonable time, place, and
manner regulations are permissible, and a content-based prohibition must
be narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest.”86
The place at issue here, public beaches, most closely resembles the
third Perry category: the traditional public forum. Places such as these are
“quintessential” public fora, defined as such because the public has
traditionally perceived and used it in that way.87 On the surface, Perry
seems to be a relatively straightforward application of the public forum
doctrine, but in practice courts and scholars continue to struggle both to
determine what a public forum is, and how it impacts free expression.88 As
Justice John Paul Stevens said, “[m]y experience on the bench has
convinced me that these categories must be used with caution and viewed
with skepticism. Too often, they neither account for the facts at issue nor
illuminate the interests at stake.”89
Accordingly, there is no set test for determining what is a traditional
public forum. Rather, the Court looks at a variety of factors to determine
whether society has, through continuing practice, resolved that a place is
a public forum.90

82. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. at 694.
83. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (finding
regulations in non-public fora permissible “as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable
and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s
view”).
84. Id.
85. Id., at 45.
86. Id., at 46.
87. Id., at 45 (citing Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
88. Justice John Paul Stevens, Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293, 1302 (1993).
89. Id.
90. Int’l. Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 681 (1992).
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The rule is applied generally, rather than particularly. The inquiry is
not into whether a particular park, sidewalk, or other property is a place
where public expression occurs, but whether the property can be defined
generally as a park, sidewalk, or other sort of property where public
expression traditionally takes place.91 In other words, while traditional
public fora are designated for the purpose of protecting expression, the test
for whether a particular place is a public forum is not necessarily whether
it has actually been a place where expression occurs, but whether if, by
tradition, it is the sort of place people go to express themselves and
exchange ideas. If it is a street, park, or sidewalk, it makes no difference
whether it is residential or public, whether it has been a location of public
debate since the founding of the nation, or whether it has been used
exclusively for the people to drive to their homes at night.92
It is also not necessary for the government to hold title to the property
for it to be deemed a traditional public forum.93 “[O]ur decisions identifying public streets and sidewalks as traditional public fora are not accidental
invocations of a cliché, but recognition that ‘wherever the title of streets
and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use
of the public.’”94 In particular, a place is more likely to be a public forum
if: the government has “abandoned any claim that it has special interests in
who walks, talks, or distributes leaflets on the [property];”95 it has traditionally been open to the public;96 and it is the sort of place, like a street, park,
or sidewalk that has from “time out of mind” been held in the public trust
91. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988) (“No particularized inquiry into the
precise nature of a specific street is necessary; all public streets are held in the public trust
and are properly considered traditional public fora.” (emphasis added); United States v.
Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1982) (noting “public places historically associated with the free
exercise of expressive activities, such as streets, sidewalks, and parks are considered, without
more, to be public for[a]” (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted)); Burson v.
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 196 (1992) (noting that quintessential public fora “include those
places which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and
debate, such as parks, streets, and sidewalks.” (internal quotations omitted)).
92. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. at 480.
93. Id.; See also Denver Area Educ.Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 792
(1996) (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788
(1985) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
94. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. at 480-81 (internal quotations omitted).
95. Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197, 198 (1972); See also Greer v. Spock, 242 U.S.
828, 837 (1976) (noting that while Flower does not stand for the proposition that the
government creates a public forum merely by opening up property to the public, it does
support the proposition that if the government abandons its claim to restrict expression, the
property become a public forum).
96. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. at 177 (noting that “whether the property has been
‘generally open to the public,’” while not dispositive, is a factor to consider).
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and used for expressive activity.97 As such, the Court has acknowledged
that it is not so inflexible as to limit its application to streets, parks, and
sidewalks. As one justice observed, a “failure to recognize the possibility
that new types of government property may be appropriate for[a] for speech
will lead to a serious curtailment of our expressive activity.”98
V. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDERLYING BOTH DOCTRINES
There are three theories underlying the protection of free speech, two
which deal directly with speech itself and its value in preserving democratic
ideals. John Stuart Mill first expressed one theory, that unrestricted speech
is the path towards truth. He wrote:
[a]nd though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon
the earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously, by licensing
and prohibiting, to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood
grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open
encounter?99
A second related theory lies in the assertion that free speech is required for
the smooth functioning of a democratic society. As articulated by
Alexander Meiklejohn, all sorts of speech deserve constitutional protection
because they enable voters to “acquire the intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the general welfare that, in theory, casting
a ballot is assumed to express.”100
But most intriguing in the context of the public trust doctrine is the
theory that free speech is valuable just because expression itself is a means
of self-realization.101
Unlike the truth and self-government theories, which view speech
as instrumental to desired social consequences, autonomony
theories emphasize the intrinsic worth of speech to individual
speakers and listeners. Justice Brandeis echoed this theme too . . .

97. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992) (finding that
airport terminals are not public fora in part because of “the lateness with which the modern
air terminal has made its appearance[.]”).
98. Id. at 698 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
99. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA – ASPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING
TO THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND (1644), reprinted in RENASCENCE EDITIONS (University
of Oregon 1997), available at http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/~rbear/areopagitica.html.
100. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV.
245, 255 (1961).
101. SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 13, at 962.
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suggesting ‘that [t]hose who won our independence believed that
the final end of the State was to make men free to develop their
faculties; [they] valued liberty both as an end and as a means.’ An
emphasis on individual self-realization readily extends First
Amendment protection beyond the political realm to art, literature
and even entertainment and advertising.102

The parameters of speech defy codification. Rather, freedom of
expression is something to be understood and arrived at through “an
elaborate mosaic of specific judicial decisions.”103 The Court has found
that “constitutionally protected forms of communication include parades,
dances, artistic expression, picketing, wearing arm bands, burning flags and
crosses, commercial advertising, charitable solicitation, rock music, some
libelous false statements, and perhaps even sleeping in a public park.”104
Likewise, the public trust doctrine is grounded on the notion that
humans, by virtue of their being human and nothing more, have a
fundamental right to self-realization, which, in this context, would include
access to the sea. While the doctrine has been used to provide access for
commercial purposes such as shipping, fishing, and navigation, it has also
drawn its authority from the connection so many people feel for the sea,
and the right of people simply to follow the feeling that draws them to it.105
“Beaches, resorts, marinas, harbors and the general lure of the waters bring
people to the coasts in droves to fish, surf, bathe, sunbathe, sail, build, stroll
and live their time-honored ‘pursuit of happiness.’”106
VI. LEYDON V. TOWN OF GREENWICH
Connecticut employs a broad interpretation of the public trust doctrine.
It encompasses all land from the high tide mark seaward, to the low tide
mark and all navigable waters.107 It includes a wide range of activities
including “fishing, boating, hunting, bathing, taking shellfish, gathering
seaweed, cutting sedge, and of passing and repassing . . .”108 The state also
enforces the public forum doctrine consistent with Supreme Court holdings,

Id.
Stevens, supra note 88, at 1300.
Id. at 1298 (footnotes omitted).
COASTAL STATES ORGANIZATION, INC., supra note 4, at xii.
Id. at xii (emphasis added).
CONNECTICUT DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, OFFICE OF LONG ISLAND SOUND
PROGRAMS, FACT SHEET, THE PUBLIC TRUST (2004),
http://www.dep.state.ct.us/olisp/publications/publictrust.htm.
108. Town of Orange v. Resnick, 109 A. 864, 865 (Conn. 1920).
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
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applying the strict scrutiny test to any government infringement of
protected speech.109 Under strict scrutiny, the government must have a
compelling reason to restrict access, and any such restriction must be
narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.110 The restriction should not
hinder speech any more than is absolutely necessary.111
In Leydon I, the Connecticut appellate court issued a seemingly
straightforward decision overturning the lower court’s ruling that the Town
of Greenwich could legally prohibit “out-of-towners” from the town
beach.112 Greenwich Point Park is a 147-acre town owned park that
includes a stretch of beach on Long Island Sound.113 The Town restricted
access to residents and fined out-of-towners twenty-five dollars if they
violated the ordinance.114
An out-of-town jogger argued that the state held the beach in trust for
all residents, thus prohibiting the town from discriminating against state
residents who were not also town residents.115 He also asserted the
ordinance violated his rights to free speech under the state and federal
constitutions.116 The Town maintained that the public trust doctrine in
Connecticut only applies to the intertidal zone, not the dry sand the jogger
wanted to run along.117 The appellate court, however, agreed with the
jogger and overturned the lower court, holding that “land held by a municipality as a public park or public beach is held for the use of the general
public and not solely for use by the residents of the municipality.”118
The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court but based
its decision on the public forum doctrine, instead of relying on the public
trust doctrine.119 First, it found that that the jogger’s desire to assemble and
talk with other beach-goers constituted the sort of expressive and
associative activities that fall within the embrace of First Amendment

109. Leydon II, 777 A.2d 552, 571 (Conn. 2001).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Leydon I, 750 A.2d 1122 (Conn. 2000).
113. Id. at 1124.
114. Id. at 1125 n.6.
115. Id. at 1125.
116. Leydon II, 777 A.2d at 560-61. “The complaint alleges . . . that the ‘[p]laintiff’s
attempt to enter upon the [p]ark was for the purposes of expressing himself by exchanging
ideas and information with other park users on topics of social and political importance.’”
Id. at n.10.
117. Leydon I, 750 A.2d at 1126 n.8.
118. Id. at 1126 (citations omitted).
119. Leydon II, 777 A.2d at 565 n.20.
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protection.120 Even if the jogger did not intend to express himself, the court
found that “there can be no doubt that the plaintiff sought admission to
Greenwich Point to exercise his constitutional right to freedom of
association, which, alone, is sufficient to implicate the protections of the
federal and state constitutions.”121 It then found that the ordinance was
overbroad, that even if it had not yet restricted the plaintiff’s or anyone’s
constitutional right to expression, the ordinance was unconstitutional
merely because, as written, it had the potential to restrict expression.122 The
ordinance, the court noted, reached “a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct” and the mere risk that it would have a “chilling
effect on others who fear to engage in the expression that the [ordinance]
unconstitutionally prohibits.”123
It also determined that the beach itself was a public forum.124 The court
emphasized the park-like characteristics of the beach, such as the parking
lot, nature center, and walkways. But it also cited with favor precedent
asserting there was nothing to preclude a similar finding about a beach that
was not connected to a park.125 It expressly noted that it did not “mean to
suggest that a municipal beach without some or all of the other attributes
of Greenwich Point would not constitute a park—and, therefore, a
traditional public forum—for first amendment purposes.”126
Because it found that Greenwich Point was a public forum, the court
applied strict scrutiny to the ordinance. In particular, any attempt by the
government to enforce a wholesale exclusion of a particular class of people,
such as out-of-towners, is likely to fail under the time, place, and manner
test that governs state restrictions on speech in a public forum.127 This
restriction failed because “in any public forum, by definition, all parties
have a constitutional right of access.”128 The court found that the
120. Id. at 562 n.13.
121. Id.
122. See id. at 566.
123. Id. at 556 (quoting State v. Linares, 655 A.2d 737 (Conn. 1995)).
124. Id. at 568.
125. Leydon II, 777 A.2d at 569 n.26 (citing Naturist Soc’y, Inc. v. Fillyaw, 958 F.2d
1515, 1522-23 (11th Cir. 1992)). The court noted many similarities between parks and
beaches. It found that none of the proposed reasons for distinguishing between the two, such
as the vulnerability of scantily-clad sunbathers with their possessions arranged out in the
open around them and the shortage of law enforcement officials, justified denying public
forum status to a beach. Id.
126. Id. at 571 n.29.
127. Id. at 571 (citing Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 678 (1998))
(finding that public fora have “objective characteristics . . . [that] require the government to
accommodate private speakers.”).
128. Id. at 573 (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37,
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“ordinance bars a large class of nonresidents . . . from engaging in a
multitude of expressive and associational activities at Greenwich Point.”129
In effect, the supreme court found that under the state constitution any
activity that is compatible with the customary and normal activity of a place
is expressive, and therefore worthy of constitutional protection.130
Applying this test to activities at Greenwich Point, the court found the
range of expressive conduct to be virtually limitless and would include
“walking on the beach in a T-shirt that expresses a particular political view
or religious conviction, distributing literature or pamphlets in the parking
lot, walkway or at a picnic table, participating in a silent vigil anywhere in
the park, and soliciting signatures for a petition at the entrance to the
park.”131 The court specifically found that this wide range of activities
would be considered expressive activity at the beach “even if that property,
in contrast to Greenwich Point, contains no other attractions or activities
and, therefore, is used solely as a beach.”132
VII. A NEW DOCTRINE: THE “PUBLIC ACCESS DOCTRINE”
It was no mistake that the Connecticut courts found access based on
both the public trust and public forum doctrines. Despite their differences,
both protect fundamental rights and together they suggest a new theory
upon which the public can claim access to the beaches: because beaches
fall under the public trust doctrine, the state has a property interest
sufficient to invoke the public forum doctrine’s protection for places where
people traditionally gather to exchange ideas. Because beaches are public
fora they are subject to the time, place, and manner test regarding any state
restriction on expressive use. Furthermore, recreation is an expressive use,
so any restriction on beach access must pass constitutional muster via the
time, place, and manner test.
The assumption that beaches are public fora could be challenged on the
ground that not all beaches are government property. The proposed public
access doctrine relies on a broad view of government property that
encompasses more than that which the government holds actual title to.
Many beaches are privately owned. In particular, the beaches at issue in

55 (1983)).
129. Id. at 573.
130. Leydon II, 777 A.2d at 575. See also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104
(1972). This standard, briefly adopted by the Supreme Court, held that speech would be
subject to strict scrutiny as long as it was compatible with the use of the public property.
131. Leydon II, 777 A.2d at 575.
132. Id. at 575 n.38.
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Maine were private and not public property.133 The public forum doctrine,
however, supports a broad view of government property. As initially
articulated, it was to apply not to government-owned property, but to streets
and parks “[w]herever the title . . . may rest.”134 While public forum issues
arise most often in the context of government-owned property, the Supreme
Court has readily extended it to non-government property, noting that:
[t]he history of this Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence . . . is
one of continual development, as the Constitution’s general
command that ‘Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press,’ has been applied to new
circumstances requiring different adaptations of prior principles
and precedents.135
Rather than focus on ownership, the Court has instead focused on the use
of a particular place for expression.136 The test is not whether a particular
beach has been used for expression, but whether beaches in general are
places of expression.137 If this test is met, the Court has specifically found
that government ownership is unnecessary.138
Even without legal ownership, state governments have a strong
property interest in beaches through the public trust doctrine. In most
states, the jus publicum title vests ownership of the beaches in the
sovereign state, but rights to the use of the land is to be held in a public
trust.139 If the beach is privately owned, that title is subservient to the
state’s jus publicum title. The owner can never own any part of the
property interest included in the jus publicum title, which excludes the right
of the land owner to restrict access to the public for navigation, fishing,
fowling, and whatever other uses are encompassed in a particular state’s
public trust doctrine.140 “Thus, even though the upland owner ‘owns’ the
beach or submerged lands, that ownership is still subject to several
paramount rights of the public to use those trust lands for public trust
purposes.”141 In short, states have a strong property interest that justifies

133. Bell II, YORSC-CV-84-125 (Me. Super. Ct., Yor. Cty., Sep. 14, 1987) (Brodrick,
J.), 1987 Me. Super. LEXIS 256 at 1.
134. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. at 515.
135. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 740 (1996).
136. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 681 (1992).
137. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988).
138. Id. at 474.
139. COASTAL STATES ORGANIZATION, INC., supra note 4, at 6.
140. Id. at 7.
141. Id.
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and even compels the consideration of their beaches as traditional public
fora where free speech should be protected under the public forum doctrine.
It is important to note that in Maine and Massachusetts, the jus
publicum title is not superior to the jus privatum, but instead is considered
little more than an easement.142 This, however, is not a serious obstacle for
considering their beaches as public fora. First, while the public trust
doctrine is considered only an easement in these two states, that easement
differs from other easements in that it can never be sold or abrogated. As
the Supreme Court clearly stated in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, a
state’s obligation to preserve access under the public trust doctrine is
inalienable.143 So while in many ways the jus publicum title may be
considered something less than fee simple ownership (particularly in Maine
and Massachusetts) the jus publicum is also something more: namely it
cannot be sold.144
The Supreme Court has further noted in dicta that the public forum
doctrine can apply even to property that the government does not have title
to.145 “Indeed, in the majority of jurisdictions, title to some of the most
traditional of public fora, streets and sidewalks, remains in private
hands.”146 Beaches, as well, are often held privately, but whatever the
jurisdiction, precedent and common sense dictate that this fact does not
create a serious impediment to at least their consideration as public fora.
Another obstacle to whether the public forum doctrine should apply to
beaches is the argument that beaches are not places where people come to
exchange ideas. As the Supreme Court has noted:
the extent to which the Government can control access depends on
the nature of the relevant forum. Because a principal purpose of
traditional public fora is the free exchange of ideas, speakers can
be excluded from a public forum only when the exclusion is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and the exclusion is
narrowly drawn to achieve that interest.147
The Leydon II court correctly noted that the inquiry is not whether a
particular beach has been used as a public forum, but whether beaches are

142. Bell III, 557 A.2d 168, 173 (Me. 1986).
143. 146 U.S. 387, 460 (1892).
144. Id.
145. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 792 (1996).
146. Id. (citing 10A E. MCQUILLIN, LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 30.32 (3d ed.
1990)).
147. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
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places that, by tradition, have been used for expressive activities.148 It
approved of Justice Kennedy’s comment that “[t]he liberties protected by
[the public forum] doctrine derive from the Assembly, as well as the
Speech and Press Clauses of the First Amendment, and are essential to a
functioning democracy. . . . [P]ublic places are of necessity the locus for
discussion of public issues, as well as protest against arbitrary government
action.”149 The status of beaches in general as public fora has been
considered in several states with different results, but the weight of
authority seems to favor including both beaches and parks within the
doctrine.150 Just as it is not necessary for every sidewalk to be a place of
expression or protest, it is also unnecessary for every beach to be filled with
political placards in order for the doctrine to apply. Rather, the unifying
requirement of all public fora appears to be that they are places where
people naturally gather to express their views.
There is a well-established body of law which suggests that courts treat
beaches as traditional public fora because they are places where expression
is valued. The Leydon II court found that the town had infringed on the
jogger’s First Amendment right to go to the beach to discuss “topics of
social and political importance.”151 It was the jogger’s desire to talk about
his own case that gave rise to a First Amendment claim.152
But even without a specific finding that a plaintiff sought entrance to
the beach in order to discuss politics, there remains a strong argument that
any restriction challenging a government limitation on beach access is

148. Leydon II, 777 A.2d 552, 567 n.23 (Conn. 2001).
149. Id. at 568 (quoting Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. at 696).
150. Id. at 569-70 n.27 (citing Naturist Soc’y, Inc. v. Fillyaw, 958 F.2d at 1522 (finding
a Florida state beach was a public forum); United States v. Frandsen, 212 F.3d 1231, 1237
(11th Cir. 2000) (reversing a district court’s finding that the Canaveral National Seashore
in Florida was not a public forum); Smith v. Fort Lauderdale, 177 F.3d 954, 956 (11th Cir.
1999) (conclusively establishing that the Fort Lauderdale Beach is a public forum); Paulsen
v. Lehman, 839 F.Supp. 147, 161 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding that Jones Beach in New York
is a public forum); Gerritsen v. Los Angeles, 994 F.2d 570, 576 (9th Cir. 1993) (preserving
the entire area of the El Pueblo Park in Los Angeles as a public forum); Kaplan v.
Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024, 1025, 1029 (2d Cir. 1989); McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716,
719, 722 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding a small Scarsdale, New York space to be a public forum);
Flamer v. White Plains, 841 F.Supp. 1365, 1368, 1374 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)).
151. Leydon II at 562 n.13.
152. Id. The court noted that the jogger wanted to go to the beach to give a newspaper
interview about his case to the New York Times, and that “there can be no doubt that the
plaintiff sought admission to Greenwich Point to exercise his constitutional right to freedom
of association, which, alone is sufficient to implicate the protections of the federal and state
constitutions.” Id.
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overbroad.153 Under this analysis, a plaintiff would have had a right to
challenge the beach access restriction as an unconstitutional prior
restriction on speech even though his own rights may not have been
violated.154 But whether it is framed as an issue of actual infringement of
expression or potential infringement of expression, the Leydon II court
correctly applied the classic strict scrutiny test. Under this test, “[t]he
government can exclude a speaker from a traditional public forum only
when the exclusion is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and the
exclusion is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest.”155 As such, only
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on expression are
permitted.156 Finding that the town’s total ban on out-of-town residents
failed this test, the Leydon II court opened the beach to everyone.157
Under the public access doctrine posited here, the courts in Maine and
Massachusetts, or in any state for that matter, may find that the state’s
public trust of the beaches raises a government interest sufficient to
implicate the public forum doctrine. The doctrine would then apply
because beaches are places of public expression, either directly, indirectly,
or by nature of their long history as places of gathering and assembly. And
as public fora, the restrictions to access places such as Moody Beach in
Wells, Maine would be considered unconstitutional infringements on the
right to speech and assembly.
Of course the prohibition against restrictions on freedom of expression
applies only to the government and not to individuals, or, in the case of
Moody Beach, private owners of shorefront property. Landowners can
restrict whatever expression they want on their own land and even restrict
access to whomever they chose.158 It is government involvement that
triggers First Amendment concerns. Such involvement is inherent in the
ownership stake that the public trust doctrine gives to the state.

153. Id. at 335.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 571 (quoting Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677).
156. Id. at 572.
157. Id. at 573.
158. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722-26 (1961). The Supreme
Court found that a private restaurant violated the equal protection clause when it refused
service to African Americans because the business was sufficiently connected to the state via
a lease and other financial arrangements. But it noted without such connections “that private
conduct abridging individual rights does no violence to the Equal Protection Clause unless
to some significant extent the State in any of its manifestations has been found to have
become involved in it.” Id. at 722.
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There is also precedent for enforcement of constitutional rights even
when the primary actor is a private party.159 In the famous case of Shelley
v. Kraemer, a neighborhood association sought government enforcement
of a covenant that barred black families from buying homes in their
neighborhood. The Supreme Court found
[t]hat the action of state courts and judicial officers in their official
capacities is to be regarded as action of the State within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, is a proposition which has long
been established by decisions of this Court. That principle was
given expression in the earliest cases involving the construction of
the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment.160
Regardless of whether the state is acting on its own authority as in Leydon
II by restricting access to residents, or at the request of landowners seeking
to preserve their power to evict alleged trespassers, there is sufficient state
action to invoke the protections of the speech and expression.
It would be hard to find a state interest compelling enough to justify
even small restrictions on access. After all, a government that is already
obligated by the public trust doctrine to allow access to a person walking
“along a beach carrying a fishing rod or a gun,”161 can hardly have a
compelling interest in stopping someone without a fishing rod from
walking along the beach. Lacking a compelling state interest, there is no
government action narrow enough to justify restricting access to the
beaches, and the public access doctrine, should a court apply it, would
insure the nation’s beaches are available to everyone.
Again and again courts are concerned with free speech as a prerequisite
to a functioning democracy. While courts have found that beaches qualify
under the public forum doctrine,162 beaches present a unique opportunity
for the courts to consider another rational for protecting the freedom of
expression in a public forum analysis: the need to protect expression as a
means of self-fulfillment. Unlike sidewalks or city squares, beaches attract
people because of their ability to soothe and calm. They are places where
people go for self-reflection and meditation, or just for fun.
Our need for the ocean and the beaches might be quantifiable through
studies that count the masses who are drawn each year to the water.163 Or

159. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
160. Id. at 14.
161. Eaton v. Town of Wells, 2000 ME 176, ¶ 51, 760 A.2d 232, 248-49.
162. See Leydon II, 777 A.2d 552, 568 (Conn. 2001).
163. Tourism, the largest industry in the United States, depends primarily on the success
of coastal states to attract vacationers. Miami alone attracts more tourists than the combined
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it might be the marvel of a writer, such as Melville: “But look! Here come
more crowds, pacing straight for the water, and seemingly bound for a
dive.”164 Perhaps it will appear as the obvious justification for an ancient
law that forbids obstacles in the approach to the seas: “By the law of nature
these things are common to all mankind—the air, running water, the sea,
and consequently the shores of the sea.”165 Even the Puritans, who might
have blanched at the thought that their spiritual beliefs would someday be
used to argue in favor of allowing people to expose their skin to the sun’s
rays, understood that recreation was good for the soul. But whether
quantified, marveled over, codified, or worshipped, beach access falls
within the realm of self-fulfillment, one of the fundamental justifications
for the protection of expression.
Courts can find that beaches are public fora not only because they are
places where crowds traditionally gather and ideas are traditionally
exchanged, but because beaches, by their very nature, are an irreplaceable
means of achieving free expression of ideas and self. Under this theory, the
purpose of the First Amendment is not merely to protect expression that is
useful for democracy, but to protect expression that leads to selffulfillment. Such forms of expression might include walking on the beach,
listening to the surf, or building a sand castle.
One line of cases that addresses restrictions on expressive conduct
deals not with the notion of conduct as valuable as a means of selfexpression, but with conduct that has a political content, such as symbolic
protests through burning a draft card166 or a flag.167 In such situations, the
courts ask whether “[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was
present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it.”168 But courts have also been willing
to extend protection to expressions whose purpose is to entertain, rather
than inform or persuade.169 In crafting its test for what speech is obscene

annual draw of Yellowstone, Grand Canyon, and Yosemite National Parks. On average, 180
million people go the coast each year. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association,
Ocean Facts on Coastal Tourism, http://www.yoto98.noaa.gov/facts/tourism.htm (last
visited Apr. 4, 2006).
164. HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK (The Franklin Library 1979) (1851).
165. JUSTINIAN, supra note 20, at 2.1.1.
166. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 386 (1968) (reversing an appeals court ruling
that struck down a government law prohibiting war protesters from burning their draft
cards).
167. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (affirming a lower court ruling that
restrictions on flag burning are unconstitutional).
168. Id. at 404 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)).
169. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (finding “[t]he importance
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and therefore beyond the embrace of constitutional protection, the Supreme
Court has been careful to ensure protection for expressions that have
“artistic value.”170 It has protected nude dancing as an expression, finding
that “[e]ntertainment, as well as political and ideological speech, is
protected.”171 It has protected a production of Hair, a rock musical,172 a
drive-in theater that wanted to show nude women,173 and the right of
activists to knock on doors to ask for contributions to their cause.174 It is
clear, as Justice Stevens noted, that the numerous types of expression now
within the embrace of the First Amendment extend beyond “matters that
were appropriate subjects of debate at a New England town meeting . . .
even if the dictionary definition of the word ‘speech’ has not changed since
1791 . . . .”175
Under the proposed public access doctrine, it would not be necessary
to show that a person seeking access to a beach is doing so in order to
express a view to the crowds that gather there. It would be enough merely
to want to go to the beach in order to relax. Relaxation and self-fulfillment
would be considered types of expression worthy of constitutional protection. Nor would it be necessary, as some might fear, that the doctrine be
extended to other places of natural sanctuary, such as mountains or lakes.
Unlike the waterfront, there is no ancient doctrine guaranteeing access that
has survived not only the passage of centuries, but also translation from one
culture to another. Beaches truly are unique, and the public access doctrine
by acknowledging this reality will insure their availability for all who
desire them. The only extension that such an acknowledgment would
require is a small one, one already acknowledged in states such as New
Jersey and California. People would have access not only to the intertidal
zone, but also to that sliver of sandy beach to which they are entitled in
order to exercise their constitutional right to enjoy the sun, the surf, and the
sand.

of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion is not lessened by the fact that they are
designed to entertain as well as to inform.”)
170. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1989).
171. Shad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981).
172. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 552 (1975) (reversing a
lower court ruling that the city could prevent the production on the grounds that the city’s
act constituted prior restraint of expression).
173. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975).
174. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 633–34 (1980).
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